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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20020590-CA 
ARGUMENT 
L 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA 
IS REQUIRED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S 
BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT. 
The State posits that the prosecutor technically did not breach the plea 
agreement by recommending to the Board of Pardons and Paroles that Lehi be 
incarcerated for a minimum of two and a half years, because the plea agreement 
necessarily contemplated only a recommendation to the trial court, because it 
specified a recommendation for jail time, something which only the trial court, 
and not the Board of Pardons, could order. State's brief at 16. 
The State's argument that the plea agreement necessarily bound the 
prosecutor's recommendation only to the trial court because the Board of 
Pardons had no authority to order a jail sentence overlooks the transcript of the 
plea hearing, which reflects Lehi's, trial counsel's, and the prosecutor's 
understanding and agreement, that the prosecutor would recommend no further 
1 
prison time. See R. 108 at 4-6, in the Addendum to this brief. 
As defense counsel explained to the trial court, 
Your Honor, Mr. Lehi - this will be a change of plea. He's 
pleading guilty to the Third Degree Felony and, urn, in exchange for 
that plea the State has agreed to recommend that he only serve 90 
days in the, ah, San Juan County Jail. And also there is a - he's 
been doing some time in - ah, on some charges out of Blanding. 
And he's been - he had 68 days that he had to serve out of 
Blanding. He has 27 days left and the State has agreed that he 
could, ah, serve those days, urn - ah concurrent. So, ah, that's the 
situation. 
One of the reasons for this recommendation is this: Is Mr. Lehi 
was arrested back, ah - back whenever this charge first came up, 
and, urn, ah, in the mean time, ah, before he could get to trial, he 
was arrested for DUI over in, ah - over in New Mexico. So the 
consequence of that DUI - and that - and that was a DUI that he 
picked up while this matter was pending, and the State wasn't happy 
about that. But he did time in prison, as a result of that DUI, and 
he's presently on parole from - to the State of New Mexico. So part 
of our plea negotiation was just something that Mr. Lehi has already 
done prison time, ah, as a - as a consequence of having a DUI. 
He's on parole right now and he should be given the 
opportunity to prove himself that he's, ah, been able to rehabilitate 
himself and, ah - and also while he's on parole to another state. So 
the State did still want a felony on him and so he's pleaded to the 
felony. But they have agreed that he wouldn't have to do any 
additional prison time or not to recommend any additional prison 
time. And as a part of the plea bargain, it says in there that, urn -
that he continue with his New Mexico pa- - ah, parole. 
(R. 108 at 4-5)(Emphasis added). 
The prosecutor's letter to the Board of Pardons recommending that Lehi 
be imprisoned for a minimum of two and half years obviously violated the plea 
agreement and requires withdrawal of the plea. See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 
765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988). 
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Even if the record did not expressly reflect that the prosecutor agreed not 
to recommend prison time, many courts have recognized that mere technical 
compliance with a plea agreement which realistically violates the spirit of the plea 
agreement constitutes a breach of the agreement. See, e.g.. State v. Blackwell. 
522 S.E.2d 313, 315 (N.C. App. 1999). 
In Blackwell. the prosecution used the defendant's prior offenses 
derivatively to prove other offenses underlying a charge of felony murder, after 
having agreed in a plea bargain not to use those other offenses directly in 
prosecuting the felony murder charge. On appeal, the defendant claimed a 
breach of the plea agreement, and the court agreed, stating, 
Even though a plea agreement arises in the context of a 
criminal proceeding, it remains in essence a contract. State v. 
Rodriguez, 111 N.C.App. 141, 144, 431 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1993). 
However, it is markedly different from an ordinary commercial 
contract. By pleading guilty, a defendant waives many constitutional 
rights, not the least of which is his right to a jury trial. State v. Pait, 
81 N.CApp. 286, 289, 343 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1986). "No other right 
of the individual has been so zealously guarded over the years and 
so deeply embedded in our system of jurisprudence as an accused's 
right to a jury trial." State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 712, 239 S.E.2d 
459, 465 (1977). As such, due process mandates strict adherence to 
any plea agreement. Rodriguez, 111 N.CApp. at 145, 431 S.E.2d at 
790. Moreover, this strict adherence "require[s] holding the [State] to 
a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly 
than would be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for 
imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements." United States v. 
Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986). 
Blackwell at 731. 
The court rejected the government's suggestion that the defendant should 
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have specified that the government could not use the prior offenses derivatively 
in the plea agreement, stating, 
The State suggests that defendant should have bargained for this 
interpretation. But defendant should not be forced to anticipate 
loopholes that the State might create in its own promises. Using 
defendant's guilty plea to felonious impaired driving to prove the 
underlying felony of assault is no less a violation of the plea 
agreement than if the State had just gone ahead and introduced 
evidence of the felonious impaired driving. Here, the State used 
defendant's plea as the same proof. Thus, even if the State did not 
violate the express terms of the plea agreement, it did violate the 
spirit of that agreement. Cf. State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 633 P.2d 
432, 438 (Ct.App.1981) ("A breach of a plea agreement occurs not 
only when the prosecution breaks its promise, but also when the 
spirit of the inducement is breached."); Van Buskirk v. State, 102 
Nev. 241, 720 P.2d 1215,1216 (1986) ("The violation of the terms or 
'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal."). We therefore hold 
that the State violated defendant's plea agreement. 
Biackweii at 731-732. 
Likewise in the instant case, Lehi entered his guilty plea with the 
understanding that the prosecutor would recommend no further prison, but ninety 
days in jail, concurrent with Lehi's Blanding sentence, and continued New 
Mexico Parole (R. 93-95; R. 108 at 4-6). It is not reasonable to suggest that 
Lehi, a lay person, or even defense counsel should have anticipated that this 
plea agreement meant that the day after the prosecutor recommended the 
sentence contemplated by the plea agreement, he would turn around the very 
next day and recommend Lehi's imprisonment for a minimum of two and half 
years. His recommendation to the Board of Pardons violated the spirit of the 
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plea bargain and should be viewed as a breach. See, e.g.. Blackwell, supra. 
As Lehi's plea affidavit confirms, he was induced to enter his plea by his 
understanding that the prosecutor would make this ifvnmiiiriiilHtif ,i, (I' ' r.-i 9r). 
The State cites State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976), for the 
following proposition: 
"Where a defendant is aware there is no guarantee the court will 
agree to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor," as was the 
case here, "There is no reason to set aside a plea of guilty." 
State's brief at 18. 
While the State's qui >i alio'i of Garfield is ao",in -al'v MM1 <"< ni'1 ';|ii«ii<i lead 
the Garfield opinion and confirm that the Garfield actually supports Lehi's 
position that if the prosecutor failed to comply with his plea agreement to 
recommend no further prison time, Lehi his plea. 
In Garfield, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor failed to make a 
sentencing recommendation which induced his plea. While the court did make 
the statement quoted in IIn1 '• hie ' hnot this statement was dictum lm II le i I 
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor 
conveyed the sentencing recommendation contemplated in the plea agreement. 
The Garfield opinion slalfi:, 
The record clearly establishes defendant understood the court was 
not bound by any recommendation of the prosecutor. Where a 
defendant is aware there is no guarantee the court will agree to 
follow the recommendation of the prosecutor, there is no reason to 
set aside a plea of quilty. Furthermore, a mere subjective belief of a 
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defendant as to potential sentence, or hope of leniency, unsupported 
by any promise from the prosecutor or indication by the court, is 
insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing. 
This cause is remanded to determine if the sentencing judge 
were informed of the prosecutor's recommendation. If it be 
established that such a recommendation were before the court, the 
prosecutor has fulfilled his promise, and the judgment is affirmed. 
Id. at 131. See ajso State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah 
1988)(explaining that in Garfield, the court "held that if [the bargained for 
recommendation] had not been included, "the defendant was 'entitled to have his 
sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his bargain.'"). 
Utah case law, like federal case law, has long recognized that if a 
sentencing recommendation induces a defendant to plead guilty, and the 
prosecutor fails to make the recommendation, withdrawal of the plea is in order, 
regardless of the influence of the prosecutor's conduct on the sentencing court. 
See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266,1275-76 (Utah 1988)(quoting 
Santobellov. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), for the proposition that "'[A] 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement 
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.'"). 
Because the prosecutor's letter to the Board of Pardons violated the letter 
and the spirit of the plea agreement, withdrawal of the plea is in order. See, e.g.. 
Copeland; Blackwell. supra. 
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THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE 
THAT LEHI UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF 
THE OFFENSE TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY. 
The State argues that Lehi was aware of the elements of his offense, 
because his plea affidavit so indicated, and also stated that he had received a 
copy of the Amended Information, read il m 11< n I il n:i;nl In linn 'itdle s hnel it 
9-10. 
The State is correct in noting that in assessing compliance with rule 11, 
Courts ddition to the 
plea affidavit and colloquy. See State's brief at 7, citing State v. Maquire, 830 
P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991); and State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,<| 11 22 P.3d 1242. 
However, the |>K-i illi'ldvil wlii'ili supposedly reflected Lei" • 
understanding of the nature and elements of the offense did not identify or define 
the information as the source of the legal elements, and there is nothing in the 
record reflectimi IIhit I t in ,i Uy peison knew IIMI IIIU information stated the 
elements of the offense to which Lehi pled. 
More importantly, the plea affidavit itself purported to reflect Lehi's 
understanding of the legal elements, stating, 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest) are: ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE 
W/ BAC OF .08 OR GREATER W/ 2 OR MORE PRIOR DUI'S W/l 6 
YFARS 
(R.34). 
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Because there was no chemical test in this case (R. 106 at 19), and thus 
no way for the prosecution to prove or Lehi to admit to a "BAC of .08 or greater," 
the plea affidavit shows that Lehi misunderstood the elements of the offense to 
which he pled. 
The trial court never corrected the erroneous elements in the affidavit, nor 
clarified the correct legal elements for Lehi, demonstrating a failure to strictly 
comply with Rule 11, and the constitutional law requiring trial courts to establish 
the defendant's understanding of the legal and factual bases for a guilty plea. 
See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point I. 
Because the trial court did not clarify or correct the plea affidavit, the plea 
was not taken in compliance with Rule 11 or the governing constitutional law. 
See, e.g.. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476-77 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
In Smith, the Court carefully explained how this Court will review plea 
colloquies in conjunction with plea affidavits to assess compliance with Rule 11, 
and directed the trial courts to go beyond insuring that defendants have read and 
understand the affidavits and signed them voluntarily, stating, 
The inquiry cannot stop there, however. State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 
1332 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (incomplete affidavit coupled 
with inquiry only into understanding and voluntariness fails to meet 
Gibbons Rule 11 requirements). Any omissions or ambiguities in the 
affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any 
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. 
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Smith at 477. 
The Smith Court implicitly recognized that when errors in plea affidavits go 
unaddressed by trial courts, the entry of the pleas is incorrect, by stating the 
converse proposition: 
A Rule 11 deficiency in the affidavit will not, however, render the 
plea invalid where incomplete or missing information in the affidavit 
is supplied in the plea colloquy when the defendant enters the plea. 
Smith at 477. 
While the affidavit and colloquy in Smith both correctly stated the legal 
elements, in the instant matter, the affidavit misstated the legal elements, and the 
trial court did nothing to correct the error. Accordingly, the plea was not taken in 
compliance with Rule 11. Cf. id. See also State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332, 
1335 (Utah App. 1989)(when trial court did not establish elements and factual 
basis for plea during colloquy, but relied on affidavit which was deficient in this 
regard, these facts mandated the withdrawal of the plea). The State argues 
that Lehi understood the elements of the offense to which he pled, because the 
two alternative means of proving DUI, by proving either a BAC of .08 or greater, 
or by proving that the driver was under the influence to a degree rendering him 
incapable of driving safely, are "conceptually identical" means of proving the 
offense of DUI. State's brief at 10, citing State v. Bratthauer. 354 N.W. 2d 774, 
776 (Iowa 1984); and Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314,1319 (Utah 1983). 
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The Bratthauer court did not address elements or factual basis in the 
context of a motion to withdraw a plea, but found that the trial court did not err in 
requiring a jury to reach a unanimous verdict under subsections (a) and (b), after 
explaining that subsection (b) reflected a legislative presumption that someone 
was under the influence if they had that level of alcohol in their body. 354 
N.W.2d at 777. 
Bratthauer is further inapposite, because the Iowa DUI statute does not 
have the same alternative means of proving DUI that the Utah statute currently 
has, but instead provides, 
1) A person shall not operate a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways of this state in either of the following conditions: 
(a) While under the influence of an alcoholic 
beverage, a narcotic, hypnotic, or other drug, or any 
combination of such substances. 
(b) While having thirteen hundredths or more of 
one percent by weight of alcohol in the blood. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of this section, upon 
conviction or a plea of guilty, is guilty of: 
(c) A class "D" felony for a third offense and each 
subsequent offense 
(3) A person shall not be convicted and sentenced for 
violations of both paragraphs "a" and "b" of subsection 1 if the 
offenses were committed in the same occurrence 
id-
Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah 1983), is likewise 
inapposite, because it did not discuss the legal elements of an offense in the 
context of a motion to withdraw a plea, but instead involved judicial interpretation 
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of statutes and ordinances in the context of an equal protection challenge to 
ordinances under which the defendant was convicted. See id. 
Hall is further removed from this case, because it involved ordinances and 
outdated statutes which are not in effect in Lehi's case. The statutes and 
ordinance in effect in Hall defined presumptions for DUI cases, presuming that if 
a BAC was below .05, the person was not under the influence, that if a BAC was 
between .05 and .08, the person was presumed under the influence, but could 
rebut this presumption with other evidence, and that if a BAC was over .10, the 
person was presumed under the influence and could not rebut this presumption 
with other evidence. 
Thus, neither Bratthauer nor Hall establishes that the two means of proving 
DUI, by a BAC of .08 or greater, or by proof that the driver was under the 
influence to a degree rendering him incapable of driving safely, are conceptually 
identical. 
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029,1038 (Utah 1989), cited on page 11 of the 
State's brief, does not stand for the proposition that a defendant's guilty plea 
may be entered absent a record that he understood the facts and elements of the 
offense to which he pled. Rather, it involved a habeas petitioner's contention 
that it was unlawful to allow him to plead guilty to a lesser offense than was 
charged in order to obtain a lesser sentence, when it was factually impossible for 
him to have committed the offense to which he pled. See id. The opinion 
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reasoned that the entry of such a plea was lawful because the crime to which the 
petitioner pled was sufficiently similar to the offense charged to insure that his 
criminal history would accurately reflect the general nature of his criminal 
conduct, and because the defendant got the result he bargained for. See id. 
Hurst is thus inapposite to and does not control Lehi's contention that the 
record does not establish that he understood the elements and factual basis for 
the plea. Cf. id. 
By reviewing the plain language of 41-6-44 applicable on the relevant date, 
August 25, 2000, this Court can readily confirm that the DUI statute does not set 
forth two conceptually identical versions of DUI, but rather, sets forth two very 
different means of proving DUI. The statute then provided, 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
chemical test given within two hours of the 
alleged operation or physical control shows 
that the person has a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater; or (ii) is under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle 
See also Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344,1346 and n.1 (Utah App. 
1987)(driver's license division acted improperly in suspending driver's license for 
DUI, in absence of evidence that driver either had a BAC of .08 or greater, or 
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evidence that the driver was under the influence to a degree rendering him 
incapable of driving safely). 
Because the plea affidavit misstated the legal elements of Lehi's offense, 
and because the trial court did not correct or clarify the elements, the withdrawal 
of Lehi's plea is mandatory. See Smith and Valencia, supra. 
ill 
THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE 
THAT LEHI UNDERSTOOD THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
OR NATURE OF THE OFFENSE TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY. 
The State's discussion of the factual basis for Lehi's plea focuses 
exclusively on evidence from the preliminary hearing reflecting that Lehi was 
under the influence to a degree rendering him unable to drive safely, and makes 
no mention of any evidence that Lehi had a BAC of .08 or greater, see State's 
brief at 12-13, as Lehi's plea affidavit, quoted supra, would have required. 
The State argues that the facts established at the preliminary hearing 
reflect that Lehi understood the factual basis for his plea. State's brief at 11-13. 
Assuming that the preliminary hearing transcript furnishes a factual basis, 
the plea affidavit does not demonstrate that Lehi, a lay person, understood the 
facts established at the preliminary hearing were the legal basis for his plea. 
Rather, the affidavit which was written to reflect his understanding of the factual 
basis states, 
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept 
my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) 
13 
to which I am pleading guilty: 
I WAS DRIVING MY CAR 
I HAD BEEN DRINKING 
I HAVE TWO PRIOR DUIS W/l LAST 6 YEARS 
(R. 34). 
Assuming that the affidavit is fairly read as indicating that Lehi had been 
driving his car after he had been drinking alcohol, these facts do not amount to 
DUI, because it is legal to drive after drinking in this State unless one has the 
requisite BAC or is incapable of driving safely. Thus, the plea affidavit, which 
was not clarified or corrected by the trial court, reflects that Lehi misunderstood 
the facts essential to a valid plea to DUI, and misunderstood the nature of the 
offense to which he pled guilty. But see Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(e)(4)(A)(requiring courts to insure that the defendant understands both the 
elements and nature of an offense); State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 
1065, afTd, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 529.1 
In Ostler, the Court explained, 
If a defendant does "not understand the nature and elements of the 
crime to which he pled guilty," his guilty plea is involuntarily made. 
Breckenridqe. 688 P.2d at 443-44. '"Because a guilty plea is an 
admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot 
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding 
of the law in relation to the facts.'" Id. at 444 (alteration in original) 
(quoting McCarthy v. United States. 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 
1166, 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) (footnote omitted)). 
Additionally, a defendant's "understanding of the elements of the 
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may not be 
presumed from a silent or incomplete examination." Valencia. 776 
P.2d at 1335. Accordingly, a trial court's "failure to inform a 
14 
Because the trial court did not correct the plea affidavit's reflection of 
Lehi's misunderstanding of the factual nature of the offense to which he pled 
guilty, withdrawal of Lehi's plea is mandatory. See Smith; Valencia, supra. 
Conclusion 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying Lehi's motion to 
withdraw his plea and remand this matter for trial. 
DATED this ^ day of ^tinnaMK- . 2003. 
P**'s hM M w) 
KRISTINE M. ROGERS 
Counsel for Mr. Lehi 
defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a 
guilty plea conviction." Pharris. 798 P.2d at 777. 
Ostler at 2000 UT App at f 14; 996 P.2d 1069-1070. 
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ADDENDUM 
10:10 A.M. 
7TH JANUARY 2002 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Edwin Birdhand Lehi, Case 0017-85. 
BAILIFF: Let!s see if he's in there, Your Honor. 
We had him once and then he needed to — 
(Mr. Lehi entered courtroom.) 
MR. SCHULTZ: The State would recommend that you do 
a concurrent. You have 68 days to do at Blanding. You've got 
27 left. Okay. And they're gonna let you be concurrent. 
MR. LEHI: (Inaudible). 
MR. SCHULTZ: Okay? 
MR. LEHI: Yeah. (Inaudible). I want to do that 
one we were talkin1 about — (Inaudible) — defer. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Defer those to a separate issue and 
we'll talk about that. I'll ask him. I haven't forgotten 
about that. But I just want to you know that they are gonna 
recommend concurrent. 
MR. LEHI: All right. 
DEFENSE OPENING STATEMENT 
BY MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, Mr. Lehi — this will 
be a change of plea. He's pleading guilty to the Third Degree 
Felony and, urn, in exchange for that plea the State has agreed 
to recommend that he only serve 90 days in the, ah, San Juan 
County Jail. And also there is a — he's been doing some time 
in — ah, on some charges out of Blanding. And he's been — 
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he had 68 days that he had to serve out of Blanding. He has 
27 days left and the State has agreed that he could, ah, serve 
those days, urn — ah, concurrent. So, ah, that's the 
situation. 
One of the reasons for this recommendation is this: 
Is Mr. Lehi was arrested back, ah — back whenever this charge 
first came up, and, urn, ah, in the mean time, ah, before he 
could get to trial, he was arrested for a DUI over in, ah — 
over in New Mexico. So the consequence of that DUI — and 
that — and that was a DUI that he picked up while this matter 
was pending, and the State wasn't happy about that. But he 
did time in prison, as a result of that DUI, and he's 
presently on parole from — to the State of New Mexico. So 
part of our plea negotiation was just something that Mr. Lehi 
has already done prison time, ah, as a — as a consequence of 
having a DUI. 
He's on parole right now and he should be given the 
opportunity to prove himself that he's, -ah, been able to 
rehabilitate himself and, ah — and also while he's on parole 
to another state. So the State did still want a felony on him 
and so he's pleaded to the felony. But they have agreed that 
he wouldn't have to do any additional prison time or not to 
recommend any additional prison time. And as a part of the 
plea bargain, it says in there that, urn — that he continue 
with his New Mexico pa- — ah, parole. 
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